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AFTERWORD: THE RATIONAL CHOICE APPROACH
TO LEGAL RULES
JULES L. COLEMAN*

Much of the work in law and economics continues to exploit the
insight of Ronald Coase, who recognized that under conditions of full
information, rationality and zero transaction costs, any assignment of
legal rights will be efficient. Different initial allocation decisions could
affect the distribution of wealth, but not its ultimate efficiency.' This
insight, however, has had two detrimental implications for legal research,
neither of them Coase's fault.
The first involves the analytic separation of the efficiency of legal
rules from their distributive consequences. It may have appeared useful
at one time to distinguish the efficiency of legal rules from their distributive dimension. However, it was never analytically possible, nor is it now
normatively defensible to do so. This conclusion is unavoidable once we
come to see legal rules as collective goods which rational actors impose in
order to secure gains otherwise unobtainable.
The second involves the idea that the possibility of private negotiations depends on zero or at least trivial transaction costs. The assumption is that other than trivial transaction costs lead to market failure.
Market failure in turn calls for legal intervention which is intended to
replicate the outcome of a hypothetical costless market. When this idea
is accepted, legal rules can be understood in either of two ways: (1) as
necessary to establish a framework within which efficient negotiations
under conditions of low transaction costs can occur; or (2) as necessary
to rectify for market failures which occur when transaction costs are
nontrivial. This view of legal rules, however, and of rational intervention
generally, as a response to transaction costs, is not analytically satisfying
and needs to be replaced by a more sophisticated understanding of the
relationship between transaction costs and what I and others have re2
cently called endogenous transaction resources.
*

Professor of Law and Philosophy, Yale Law School.

1. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960). It is a further question
whether alternative assignments of rights yield the same or different efficient equilibria.
2. Coleman, Heckathorn & Maser, A Rational BargainingApproach to Default and Disclosure
Rules i Contract, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUn. POL'v 639 (1989); J. Coleman, Rational Risks and Rectifiable Wrongs (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
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In this essay, I will present arguments which rectify these two unfortunate misunderstandings of Coase's basic insight.
I.

RATIONAL CHOICE

In economic analysis, a set of property rights is necessary to make
possible the gains from trade. That process, securing the gains from
trade, is itself made possible by the existence of property rules. It is well
known, however, that under certain conditions that often prevail, fully
rational and voluntary action yields a suboptimal or inefficient equilibrium. One way to phrase the problem is, that under conditions of perfect
competition, rational actors, non-cooperatively pursuing individually rational strategies secure optimal outcomes in the core. When conditions
of perfect competition are not realized, independent actions, based entirely on individually utility maximizing strategies, will yield suboptimal
or inefficient outcomes. This gap between the competitive equilibrium
securable under ideal circumstances and the inefficient outcome secured
under less than ideal circumstances is a surplus. Under conditions that
regularly prevail, that surplus is unobtainable by individuals acting on
the basis of purely individually rational strategies. Thus, in order to obtain those gains, individuals must abandon action based entirely on individually rational strategies and pursue a jointly maximizing strategy.
Formally, such strategies are referred to as "cooperative." The surplus
is, therefore, usefully characterized as a "cooperative surplus." Thus, rational cooperation is aimed at capturing the cooperative surplus, that is,
the difference between the suboptimal equilibrium of failed competition
and the optimal equilibrium of perfect competition. Cooperation can be
more or less successful to the extent that it captures these gains.
The same story can be framed in the idiom of economic efficiency
and market failure. The suboptimal equilibrium secured as a consequence of individually rational strategies under certain conditions constitutes a market failure. Within the traditional law-and-economics
literature, that failure is to be rectified by the imposition of some legal
rule. The objective of the legal rule is to induce an allocation of resources
which would have resulted if the conditions which created the market
failure had never occurred. Thus, we get the view that within the market
or economic paradigm, the purpose of legal rules is to mimic efficient
markets by producing Pareto optimal outcomes. Of course, a variety of
possible Pareto optimal outcomes are feasible and enforceable, differing
from one another in their distributional components. However, that aspect of them is distinct from their efficiency, and otherwise not central to
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them, and thus best dealt with in some other way-perhaps by consulting
a philosopher.
Within the rational choice framework, legal rules are elements in a
scheme of rational cooperation. The traditional economic analysis,
which focuses entirely on the efficiency of perfect competition and the
inefficiency of market failure, blinds us to the ways in which the distributive and productive dimensions of legal and political constraints are
united in rational cooperation. To clarify this point, let's return to the
characterization of the problem in game theoretic terms.
Under conditions of perfect competition, rational actors maximize
their utility within the restraints imposed by the utility of others. Each
does as well as he or she might given the utility of others. Thus, under
conditions of perfect competition, a rational actor will not willingly impose any constraints on his utility maximizing behavior. Constraints
curtail self-interested action. Therefore, because a purely self-interested
person, under perfect competition, does as well as he or she might given
the utility of others, a person who self-imposed such constraints would
necessarily do less well than she would in the absence of such
3
constraints.
Legal rules are constraints. Thus, under conditions of perfect competition, legal rules, other than those which may be necessary to make
competition possible (property rights) are irrational. Constraints are rational for all actors only under conditions of market failure. As a result,
legal rules are rational for all agents only under conditions of market
failure. Within the rational choice perspective, rational cooperation is a
response to market failure. 4 Market failure, in turn, is simply the failure
of agents acting on purely individually maximizing strategies to secure a
Pareto optimal or collectively rational outcome.
Legal rules are a species of rational constraints-the components of
a scheme of rational cooperation. Constraints cannot be rational for all
actors if they are entirely redistributive in character. Such constraints
improve the welfare of some only at the expense of others. Consequently, a set of legal rules designed to move resources along the Pareto
frontier from one optimal outcome to another could not be rational for
each agent. Thus, the view that law or politics is entirely redistributive,
in this sense, is incompatible with the rational choice perspective.
In order to be rational, legal constraints must also have a productive
3.
tion, 98
ETHICS
4.

See D. GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986); Coleman, Competition and CooperaETHICS 76 (1987); Kraus and Coleman, Morality and the Theory of Rational Choice. 97
715 (1987).
But see J. COLEMAN, supra note 2.
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dimension. This follows directly from my previous argument. Legal
rules are rational constraints, and rational constraints cannot be entirely
redistributive. Therefore, in order to be rational, legal rules must also
have a productive dimension-but what does that mean?
Constraints are productive only if they increase people's welfare,
utility or well-being. They must, in some sense, make people better off.
Thinking about this in Pareto terms, it can be rational for individuals to
impose constraints on themselves only if doing so moves them towards
the Pareto frontier. Think of it this way. Such constraints cannot be
rational if individuals are already located on the frontier. They can be
rational, therefore, only if people are within the frontier. From within
the frontier, constraints cannot be rational if they move individuals further from the frontier or along some curve with the same slope as the
frontier. Moving further away may make everyone worse off, while moving along the same curve makes some better off only at the expense of
5
others, and while desirable, therefore, for some, not rational for all.
Only movement in the direction of (and ultimately to) the frontier
can be rational for all agents. Thus, constraints are rational only if they
constitute Pareto improvements for all agents. Because legal rules are
constraints, they can be rational only to the extent they constitute Pareto
5. Further movement away from the frontier need not mak e everyone worse off. This is easily
illustrated by the following graph.

X

rs

UBI

Line x,y represents the frontier. Suppose A and B find themselves at s. A movement to t is a move
away from the frontier, but it is one that makes A better off than she is at s. The crucial point is that
no such move can render everyone (A and B) better off.
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improvements for all agents. In this sense, productivity is a precondition
of rational legal constraint. This is what it means to say that rational
constraints must be rational for all agents.
With one difference, the foregoing analysis of legal rules within the
rational choice perspective squares exactly with the traditional economic
analysis of them. In the traditional economic analysis, legal rules rectify
market failures by encouraging efficient or Pareto optimal allocations of
resources. This is another way of saying that legal rules must have a
productive dimension. The one difference is that within the rational
choice perspective, legal rules must be both collectively and individually
rational. Collective rationality is simply Pareto optimality, so the difference between traditional economic analysis and the rational choice perspective is the individual rationality condition. The individual rationality
condition imposes the constraint that legal rules be mutually advantageous in a way in which the collective rationality or Pareto optimality
condition does not.
Readers familiar with my previous conceptual work on economic
analysis might be led into thinking that I am drawing attention to the
difference between Pareto superiority and Pareto optimality. In other
words, that by committing itself to the individual rationality condition,
the rational choice perspective requires legal rules to be both Pareto optimal and Pareto superior to the status quo or inefficient equilibrium. At
one time I would have drawn the same conclusion, but there is an important difference between Pareto superiority and individual rationality that
I want to emphasize. However, that discussion needs to be postponed a
moment while we return to the basic argument.
To refresh your memory, here's where the argument stands. My
claim so far is that from a rational choice perspective, within which I
believe any defensible form of economic analysis must ultimately be embedded, legal rules, understood as rational constraints, must be productive in the sense prescribed by both the collective and individual
rationality conditions.
Economic analysis countenances a role for distributive considerations, but views any concerns for distribution as exogenous to the structure of the problem and as logically distinct from the productive or
efficiency dimension of it. Such a view is precisely what the rational
choice framework denies.
From any equilibria within the Pareto frontier, the frontier can be
reached only as the result of a cooperative scheme. Cooperation exists in
a set of constraints which rational individuals could agree to and with
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which it would be rational for each to comply. There are a large number
of feasible cooperative schemes capable in theory of securing the frontier
and which could plausibly obtain the compliance of rational agents.
These schemes do not differ from one another with respect to their productive dimension-they are all "efficient." From the point of view of
classical economic theory, because they are all collectively rational or
Pareto optimal, they are all equally defensible. The choice among them
cannot be a matter of economics, and thus we get the natural dichotomy
between "efficiency" and "equity" which gets picked up in our normal
understanding of the Coase Theorem and expressed as the difference between a rule's efficiency and its distributional properties.
From the rational choice perspective, this dichotomy cannot be sustained. Constraints equally capable of securing the frontier differ from
one another in the ways in which they distribute the benefits and burdens
of cooperation. Cooperation, if it is to be defensible, must be reconstructible as the outcome of a rational choice by the parties whose behavior and well-being is to be affected by it. This requires the parties to
agree upon a division of the benefits and burdens of cooperation. For
them, the problem of cooperation is necessarily both distributive and
productive. Failure to agree upon a division of the cooperative gains
means no cooperation; that is, failure to obtain the frontier. It's not only
that there are various and different distributive consequences of legal
rules, but as long as legal rules are seen as rational constraints for mutual
advantage-as they must be within the rational choice perspective-the
very possibility of mutual advantage depends on reaching an agreement
as to the distribution of advantage. The marriage of productivity and
distribution is the bond that makes rational cooperation possible.
Once we embed the claim that the law ought to promote efficiency
or rectify market failure in a political or moral theory which makes that
claim plausible or defensible, that is, the rational choice framework, the
normative significance of the analytic distinction between efficiency and
distribution evaporates.
Legal rules are responses to market failings. Within a rational
choice framework (in which economics is ultimately embedded), inefficiency creates an opportunity for rational cooperation. Rational cooperation exists in agreement to and compliance with a set of constraints on
individually maximizing strategies. A large number of such constraints,
which differ from one another in their distributive dimension, can in theory produce efficient outcomes. Rational cooperation requires an agreement upon a set of such constraints. Thus, rational cooperation requires
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the merger of the distributive with the productive aspects of legal
practice.
Let's now make several distinctions more precise, and in doing so,
we will deepen our understanding of the role of legal rules within a rational choice perspective, and in the process more fully appreciate the
diversity of legal practice as a form of rational cooperation. Our discussion will be enhanced by analyzing a very simple graph.
FIGURE

1:

RATIONAL COOPERATION

au

e

f

s

b
USuppose s represents a suboptimal equilibrium. Points a, c, d, u, ef and
b are all Pareto optimal. Points b and a are not Pareto superior to s. At
b, A is worse off than she is at s; at a, B is worse off than he is at s. On the
other hand, when at s and faced with a choice among the alternatives on
the frontier, choice b is individually rational for B, and choice a is individually rational for A. This is the difference between Pareto superiority
and individual rationality mentioned above. A and B can obtain the frontier only if they can agree upon which point on it to accept. These points
all represent the outcomes of alternative constraints which differ from
one another on distributive grounds. That choice is not distinct from the
problem of rational cooperation either when A and B face it ex ante or
when we reconstruct that choice ex post.
It is quite common to view rational cooperation as a prisoner's dilemma problem and to understand market failure which gives rise to it in
the same way. But this graph shows why it is a mistake to view market
failures on the model of a prisoner's dilemma. In its standard formula-
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tion, the payoffs of a prisoner's dilemma are given. 6 There are no negotiations over the gains from cooperation. In a typical market failure,
however, there are various ways of rectifying the failure which differ
from one another in their distributive dimension. For similar reasons,
conceiving of rational cooperation generally as a prisoner's dilemma
problem-as have political theorists since Hobbes-is to once again ignore its central distributive aspect.
More importantly, to see legal rules as schemes of cooperation
designed to solve a prisoner's dilemma is to focus entirely on the role
such rules play in eliminating the rationality of choosing defection
payoffs (a and b in Figure 1) and therefore in making the "contract
curve" (choices c, d, u, e, and f in Figure 1) enforceable. Such a view
ignores the distributive aspects of cooperation-the choice of a contract
among alternatives on the contract curve-and in so doing, ignores the
roles legal rules play in pursuing and enforcing distributive claims and in
7
encouraging negotiations.
Once we recognize the centrality of distribution to rational coopera6. A classic example of a prisoner's dilemma serves to illustrate my point. Assume two prisoners are faced with the following alternatives: if either of them confesses while the other does not,
the confessor will be sentenced only to two years in prison, while the other will be sentenced to 12; if
neither confesses, they will both be sentenced to four years; and if both confess, each will be sentenced to 10 years. When deciding whether to confess, each prisoner reasons as follows: "It will be
to my advantage to confess regardless of what the other prisoner does: if he confesses, and I don't, I
will get 12 years, while if I do confess, I will only get 10; similarly, if he does not confess, and I also
do not confess, I will get four years, while if I do confess, I will only get two. Thus, regardless of
whether he does or doesn't confess, in either case, I'm better off confessing." Because they each go
through the same reasoning process, they both confess, and each gets 10 years in prison; whereas if
neither had confessed, each would have received only four years. Thus, each would have been better
off if neither had confessed. Although each realized this while deciding whether to confess, they also
realized that they were better off confessing no matter what the other did, and so each confessed. R.
NozICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 542 (1981).

7. Thus, there are two central distinctions between the theory of law as rational cooperation
and the economic analysis of it. The first difference is that the Pareto optimality or economic efficiency exhausts the concerns of "economics" in legal practices on the economic model, whereas the
rational choice framework emphasizes both the individual and the collective rationality conditions.
The difference is important, since only the latter provides a theory of motivation, that is, an explanation of why individuals faced with a suboptimal outcome would seek some form of third party
assistance, e.g., a legal rule. Such a rule promises (ex ante, at least) to make individuals better off.
But it is this theory of motivation which explains why people cooperate and why cooperation is so
difficult. The principle of individual rationality that motivates cooperation also motivates defections
from cooperative schemes. This is represented in Figure 1 in that payoffa is individually rational for
A, but involves defection, not cooperation. Payoff b is individually rational for B, but again b is not a
cooperative outcome. Thus, rational cooperation has a prisoner's dilemma element. That is not all
there is to it, however, for once the theory of human motivation is taken seriously, we must countenance a second difference between classical law-and-economics and the rational choice framework.
Classical law-and-economics appreciates the distributive consequences of legal rules, but does not
appreciate concerns for distributive rationality as a component of the motivation to cooperate. Thus.
in economic analysis. distributional concerns arise once the frontier is secured and they are then
dealt with outside the economic framework. In the rational choice framework, distributional issues
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tion, we can no longer treat the distributive aspect of legal rules, in the
way Coase's interpreters-including an earlier version of me-have, that
is, as exogenous to the structure of the problem to which legal rules purport to be solutions.
II.

TRANSACTION RESOURCES

In some contexts, the distributive considerations will be considerably less significant to rational cooperation than they will be under other
circumstances. The difference depends on what I call the environmentas opposed to the logical structure-of the problem. Let me explain. In
doing so I will try to correct one other mistake which grows out of the
Coasean literature: namely, the view that ex ante exchange is plausible
whenever transaction costs are low, and impossible otherwise.
Both of these points can be usefully developed by looking at the
practice of contracting. 8 Imagine two people seeking to reach an enforceable agreement in the absence of any state-like agency with the authority to enforce their agreement. Their process has two logically
distinct elements: contractingand safeguarding. Contracting consists of
specifying the terms of the agreement; safeguarding is the process by
which those terms are protected against the strategic or noncompliant
behavior of others and/or one another.
Contracting has three logically distinct phases. First, the parties try
to identify if gains exist which they can obtain by contract. To do this
they have to be able to identify the status quo and something like the
ordinary contract curve. (Neither enterprise is trivial, nor uncontroverarise in determining whether individuals can rationally cooperate in order to secure the frontier and
the problems are analyzed as part of the very same framework of rational (economic) decision.
No doubt modern economic theorists have loosely tried to link the traditional efficiency analysis
with the theory of rational choice by arguing, for example, that an efficient set of liability rules is that
which rational parties would have bargained to. A careful reading of this sort of analysis will show,
however, that invariably the author is just dressing up the collective rationality condition in rational
choice garb. Not even lip service is given to the distributive dimension of the problem while mere lip
service is all that is given to the individual rationality condition. In other words, the bargaining
model is introduced, not as a way of giving expression to the problems of division and individual
rationality, but as a vehicle for highlighting the collective rationality or Pareto optimality condition-which, like division and individual rationality, is an element of rational bargaining. The way I
prefer to structure the problem facing rational actors is as a bargaining problem embedded in a
prisoner's dilemma. Only in this way are the conditions of division and individual rationality given
their proper weight in a theory of rational cooperation. And within the market failure theory of law.
within which economic analysis of law operates, legal rules are rational constraints, that is, the
components of a scheme of rational cooperation. To focus on the Pareto optimality condition as
expressing the full demands of economic analysis is to miss entirely the relationship between law and
rational cooperation more generally. To accept that connection is, however, to abandon the separation of efficiency from distribution forever.
8. The following arguments draw heavily on Coleman. Heckathorn & Maser. supra note 2.
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sial, especially since what counts as the status quo often has a controversial moral or normative dimension.) Second, the parties, having
identified the gains, must agree upon a division of them. This involves
the process of bargaining. It is for this reason that I see the distributive
aspects of rational cooperation (which after all involves forms of explicit
or implicit contracting) as being internal to the structure of the problem-and not distinct from it. Third, the parties must render their agreement enforceable.
Each phase of contracting appeals to different dimensions of rationality. The first phase-the cooperation or coordination phase-in which
the existence of a cooperative surplus is identified, involves the collective
rationality (or Pareto optimality) condition. The second phase-the distribution phase-in which a division of the benefits of cooperation is
reached, involves a principle of concession or bargaining rationality. Finally, the third phase-the compliance or monitoring phase-in which
each individual seeks to protect him or herself against the other's freeriding or defection, involves the principle of individual rationality.
Safeguarding is the process by which the actors attempt to insure
that an agreement, once reached, is enforced. The actors are concerned
that the distribution to which they have agreed is maintained, and that
the possibility of mutual advantage does not evaporate. Safeguarding is
necessary whenever uncertainty exists, and in the absence of third parties
who reduce uncertainty by providing information or monitoring services,
it requires individuals to invest their own resources in securing the
transaction.
The truth is that individuals in general have such resources. Let's
refer to these as transaction resources. Let's continue to refer to those
facts about an environment that threaten the success of negotiations as
transaction costs. Then, it follows that the need for third party enforcement or legal rules is not a function of the extent of transaction costs, but
instead a function of the relationship between transaction costs and
transaction resources.
Rational individuals are prepared to incur at least some costs to
eliminate uncertainty. Such costs are the most important kind of transaction cost. The costs which individuals are prepared to incur fall into
three categories: (1) search, (2) division, (3) monitoring. Because each
contractor wants information about his prospects for contracting, each
will have an incentive to incur some search costs. Search costs are invested in order to enable each contractor to answer the question: Are
there gains to be had?
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Bargaining requires concessions. Concessions depend on each
party's best hope alternative and what he or she will be unwilling to accept. In order for bargaining ultimately to succeed, each individual must
be willing to incur some costs in order to obtain the relevant information.
These are division costs.
Finally, each individual wants to determine the likelihood of defection and its consequences. Only then can each hope to construct an enforceable agreement. Therefore, each individual is prepared to incur
certain monitoring costs.
The analytic nature of the problem is becoming clearer. First, individuals have an incentive to incur costs or, alternatively, to expend some
resources. In almost all circumstances, individuals have some such resources. Their motivation for expending resources is to reduce uncertainty and thereby induce optimal contracting. This is the process of
safeguarding.
Safeguarding does not presuppose either the absence of transaction
costs or the presence of the state as a safeguard-quite the contrary.
There are always transaction resources and the role of the state is to be
explained, not assumed.
The degree to which the expenditure of transaction resources is necessary is a function of the scope of uncertainty. The extent of uncertainty
is itself a function of the environment within which contracting occurs.
Let's note some of the factors affecting uncertainty. Group size can increase uncertainty. Large groups can obscure the possibility of gains,
increase uncertainties about acceptable divisions, and increase the costs
of monitoring. Heterogeneity can increase bargaining problems and monitoring. Just think how much easier it is to reach and enforce agreements
among totally like-minded individuals than it would be to do so among
individuals who have virtually no attributes, principles or values in common. Distance and time increase uncertainty, especially in monitoring.
Finally, instability or transiencein the nature of the relationship increases
uncertainty. To see this, just consider how repeat play and reputational
effects reduce uncertainty.
I mention these examples not just to show how the environment in
which contracting occurs can increase the costs of safeguarding by increasing uncertainty, but also to show how the environment can create
transaction resources upon which the parties can draw. Closely knit
communities defined by shared values and commitments may permit
contracting to occur successfully without the use of third parties simply
because the environment is so rich in transaction resources. Information
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in such communities travels quickly and accurately. Reputation works
in similar ways. Defection is easily discerned and punished. A person
contracting in that environment has resources upon which to draw that
Marco Polo clearly lacked when he first sought trading partners in the
Far East.
Analogous considerations apply among contractors in competitive
markets. Highly competitive markets provide reasonably low cost safeguards to defection and reduce divisional uncertainty by narrowing the
bargaining range. Thus, for a wide class of contracting situations, law is
a relatively high price to pay for safeguards that might otherwise be
available and endogenous to the environment in which the contract
occurs.
I say that the existence of legal rules may in some circumstances be
a high price to pay to safeguard a contract among rational actors. The
reason is that legal rules represent the contribution of third parties.
Third parties cannot be presumed willing to provide this service
costlessly. In any event, what in the absence of the "state" is a two party
contracting problem, becomes, in its presence, a three party problem.
That fact alone increases search, division and defection problems. Are
there gains for all parties? How are the gains to be distributed? For
example, if the state is a monopoly while the other parties are internal
competitors (over distributive shares), there is reason to believe the state
will secure all the economic rents. Finally, who will monitor the
monitors? On the model developed here, legal rules are exogenous transaction resources to which rational actors might legitimately appeal to
resolve problems that arise in safeguarding contracts. Thus, legal rules
are never taken as given. Their explanation depends on their relative
costs and benefits especially in comparison with endogenous transaction
resources upon which the parties can draw.
In another paper, 9 and in the book to which I referred earlier,' 0 I
develop the idea presented here in more analytically precise ways. My
object here is only to introduce the importance of endogenous transaction resources as essential to our understanding of Coase's original
insight.
Coase himself was never guilty of the mistake which I have attributed to all of the Chicago style law-and-economics that self-consciously
sees its origins in his work. Transaction costs are a black box that needs
to be filled in. It is distinctly unhelpful always to reconstruct a legal rule
9. Coleman. Heckathorn & Maser, supra note 2.
10. J. Coleman. supra note 2.
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as a solution to a market failure caused by transaction costs. Instead, I
urge the following perspective. First, identify the standard or typical
context within which the problem is embedded. Second, identify the factors in the environment that contribute to uncertainty and those factors
which constitute the pool of resources upon which parties in those circumstances might typically draw. Third, see whether the central problem which the legal rule addresses (given the context) is one of
coordination, division or defection uncertainty. Only in this way is the
view of law as a response to transaction costs meaningful and informative, for only then can we understand which sort of transaction cost is
involved and which sort of endogenous transaction resource is in inadequate supply.
Let me end with two brief remarks. The first ties together claims
made in both parts of this paper. At the conclusion of the first part, I
said that within the rational choice perspective, the distributive dimension of legal rules is as central as their productive dimension, and that
traditional law-and-economics has too easily set these elements of rational cooperation apart. So there is an apparent straightforward difference between what traditional economic analysis on the one hand and
rational choice theory on the other would predict about legal practice.
The rational choice approach would appear to predict that a greater concern for distributional dimensions of social interaction would appear in
our legal practices of rational constraint than might the economic analysis. Thus, whenever the best analysis of a legal rule or practice ignores or
downplays distributive concerns, my analysis would appear to be in
trouble, or there had better be an explanation of the practice consistent
with my theory.
Let's look at the practice of contracting as a test case. The economic analysis of contracting downplays the significance of distributional
concerns, yet if contracting is a scheme of rational cooperation, and if
distribution is at its core, how could this be? The answer, I believe, is
once again to look at the context in which most commercial contracting
occurs. In the analysis outlined here, rational contractors appeal to third
parties as safeguards against contract failure when the transaction resources endogenous to their environment are inadequate to the task.
Thus, contract rules would be especially concerned about distributional
matters only if a significant degree of uncertainty regarding potential divisions existed among contractors in the typical commercial or sales contract setting and could not be overcome by the contractors drawing upon
those endogenous transaction resources available to them. As it happens,
most such contracts are embedded in competitive markets among repeat
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players. The bargaining range is, therefore, narrowed considerably by
context, and the ability of any one party successfully to be an advantage
taker is reduced accordingly. The competitiveness of the market and the
information necessarily accumulated by repeat players reduces both the
bargaining range and the attractiveness of defection payoffs. The market
in which the contract is embedded is the low cost safeguard against unfair division and defection, thus reducing the role for legal rules, in particular, for legal rules primarily concerned to effect a "distribution" of
the gains from contracting. That is an outline of the beginning of the sort
of explanation the rational choice approach would provide to account for
the fact that so little of contract law is given over to distributional matters, even though contracting is a form of rational cooperation with distributional questions at its core. Thus, the economic and rational choice
perspectives may reach the same conclusion about the role of distributive
considerations in ordinary contracts, but for different reasons. Moreover, unlike economic analysis, the rational choice approach downplays
but does not downgrade the significance of one's interest in distributive
fairness.
Finally, if the analysis outlined here and developed elsewhere is
plausible, then many cases in contracts also have less to do with creating
safeguards against defection (or breach) than we might otherwise think.
For if a typical contract is embedded in a competitive market, the lowest
cost safeguard to defection is the existence of alternatives. Many cases
that come to a court framed as breach or defection cases actually raise
coordination problems. In ongoing relationships, what the parties are
really asking a court to do is to specify some rule or convention to reduce
uncertainty and thereby to enable future individuals to contract within a
framework whose boundaries are more precisely determined. Put another way, once we appreciate the context in which much rational contracting occurs, we realize that the parties who call upon courts are not
asking for the imposition of an efficient rule, but for the imposition of any
rule that will reduce uncertainty. For such a rule facilitates rational contracting, the long term consequences of which will be efficient. Efficiency
derives from the ongoing nature of the practice once a convention is established; it is not necessarily what rational parties demand from legal
rules themselves.
I do not want to deny that courts often and correctly seek legal rules
that are efficient as compared to ones which may not be. My point is the
more modest one, that once we force ourselves to take seriously the contexts in which the need for exogenous resources may arise, we will realize
that, at least in some cases which involve competitive markets and repeat
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play, the role of legal rules is simply one of providing salience that enables conventions to emerge. This is not to downplay the significance of
legal rules to the efficient allocation of resources, but to redirect our attention to the way in which legal rules contribute to efficient resource
allocation.

